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Fair Is Fair, and Foul Is Foul

Rereading Macbeth, and seeing it in a recent performance by the Royal Shakespeare
company, I have been struck with the starkly straightforward way Shakespeare confronts the question of relativism, the stance that is the ethical assumption of many
beginning students. It is a stance capable of sophisticated elaboration, of course witness the currently fashionable movement of deconstruction. Shakespeare, instead,
forces us to look in the other direction: at the madness that ensues in the human
mind, and in a country driven to chaos, when reason - the power to see what is
real and say what is true - is perverted.
This theme of equivocation (in its root meaning, an equal voice, or equal sound
- hence sound without meaning) is introduced in Macbeth after only nine lines in
the unforgettable chant of the witches: "Fair is foul, and foul is fair:' This riddling
line, which seems to assert that nothing is what it appears to be, also asserts that
nothing really is anything certain - nothing is really fair, or really foul. Even worse,
it may mean that nothing is distinguishable from its opposite. But a further irony
lies in the fact that this line is spoken by those whose business it is to equivocate,
to speak with practiced deceit ("... these juggling fiends I That palter with us in
a double sense;' Macbeth says when the scales fall from his eyes, V.viii.l9-20). In other
words, what is equally true, and what even the witches know, is that fair is fair, and
foul is foul; good is good, and evil, evil. The witches know the difference; otherwise
they would be mad or idiots, and they are far from that. What makes them witches
is that they prefer the foul. They are exceedingly sensitive to the foul, and they are
especially adept in discerning its shape and power in the human soul and strengthening it there. In the case of Macbeth, they do not originate the evil in his soul (nor
do they ever tell him to do a single thing), but are expert in exploiting that evil and
making it grow. The witches serve the power of darkness; in order to entangle a human, they seek to deprive reason of its power to distinguish fair from foul - that
is, they seek to make the victim mad. Lady Macbeth, who at the opening of the play
already seems unable to make the distinction, soon becomes literally mad. And Mac-
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beth, too, in the course of the action comes to see life as a "tale told by an idiot!'
For if "Fair is foul, and foul is fair;' then life is "a tale I Told by an idiot, full of sound
and fury, I Signifying nothing" (V.v.29). What Macbeth expresses here is utter nihilism or "nothingism" (for nihil means "nothing"). There is no truth; one cannot
say anything that is really so. One finally is no longer saying, but only ranting; there
is no longer intelligibility, but only "sound and fury:' One is no longer rational, but
mad, an "idiot!' "Out, out, brief candle!" is another way of indicating this extinction
of sanity, or of the light of reason. We cannot help but see that being rational and
being human are inseparable. We come to this same conclusion by noticing that the
play presents the gradual transformation of a man into a "hell-hound" (that "beast"
Lady Macbeth perversely accuses her husband of being when he does have scruples)
through the loss of reason, the loss of the ability to distinguish fair from foul.
The "light" of reason appears, more discursively, as the gap between desire and act
- the space in which debate over moral considerations (the struggle between light
and darkness) takes place. Gradually, Macbeth closes that gap, and at times succeeds
in closing it entirely, but not conclusively - cracks of light come through to the very
end. The tragedy of Macbeth - and even of Lady Macbeth, I believe - rests ultimately on the fact that they never quite succeed in obliterating their knowledge of
the good. What they ask for - at least at first - is a temporary loss of reason, or
temporary obscurity, as if they need bracing for just one tremendous act: "Stars, hide
your fires! I Let not light see my black and deep desires" (l.iv.Sl-52), Macbeth pleads,
when, even before he reaches home and Lady Macbeth, he thinks immediately of
disposing of the new Prince of Cumberland. And Lady Macbeth, still expecting his
arrival, prays:
Come, thick Night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of Hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it makes,
Nor Heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
To cry, 'Hold, hold!' (l.v.48-53)
We would have to say that both Macbeths at the outset know right from wrong
and the meaning and significance of their acts; they need relief from reason to act
out their desires - to quell reasoned hesitation. As the play soon reveals, Lady Macbeth's prayer is fully answered; we see her bully Macbeth as he struggles to decide
whether Duncan should be killed. This occurs in the well-known soliloquy, "If it were
done, when 'tis done " (l.vii.l-28). !fit were done (or finished, without consequences or
future repercussions) when it is done (perpetra.ted) - but there's the rub; that is im-
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possible. Macbeth clearly sees that he cannot "trammel up the consequence"; the assassination cannot be "the be-all and the end-all - here"; he cannot "jump the life
to come;' either here "upon this bank and shoal of time;' or in the hereafter. Not
only will the bloody deed "return to plague the inventor;' but the violation of his
trust as a kinsman, subject, and host, not to mention Duncan's spotless character,
"will plead like angels trumpet-tongued;' and "pity, like a naked newborn babe ...
I Shall blow the horrid deed in every eye!' Macbeth is well aware that the only way
to avoid the consequences of his deed is to master the future, to conquer fate. This
speech, in fear of the future, is an ominous premonition of the last meditation of
the doomed Macbeth: "Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow I Creeps in this
petty pace from day to day" (V.v.20-28). For how can he surely determine the future
except by obliterating it? And isn't this what happens to his future when he attempts
to force fate? How can he be sure of all future consequences except by encapsulating
all time into an endless today, an everlasting "Now"? In "Tomorrow, and tomorrow,
and tomorrow" there is no longer any future; no next day, no tomorrow, is distinguishable from any other tomorrow. There is only one dreadfully tedious, insipid,
meaningless today. When Macbeth and his Lady begged for darkness, they thought
that leaving out the crack of light would give them life - the will and the determination to perpetrate the deed that would take them to the summit of their ambition.
Now we know that begging for darkness means begging for death, that their former
speeches equal "Out, out, brief candle!" The terminus for Macbeth is the living death
of "Tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow;' and that of Lady Macbeth the living
death of insanity - followed speedily in each case by actual death, or extinction.
Earlier Lady Macbeth prayed that "no compunctious visitings of Nature I Shake
my fell purpose, nor keep peace between I Th' effect and it!" (I.v.45-46). As we noted
before, her prayer is answered, and she begins to equate moral debate with moral
weakness: "Art thou afeard I To be the same in thine own act and valour, I As thou
are in desire?" Now a voice for equivocation, she urges, "When you durst do it, then
you were a man!' Inverting the definition of man as the rational animal (known to
every Elizabethan), she calls his well-articulated reasons for rejecting murder unmanly- in fact worthy of a beast. The sign of a man is that he matches words with deeds:
there is no discrepancy between wanting and doing, desire and action. Her specious
wisdom prevails, and the two embark on the murder of Duncan. Macbeth joins the
forces of equivocation and vows to "mock the time with fairest show" (l.vii.83). He
has a momentary return of clarity after the deed, when he foresees that "from this
instant, I There's nothing serious in mortality" (ll.iii.93-94), but ironically his hearers
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may interpret his bleak words as a grieved response to the death of his king. Macbeth
now is an equivocator, even when he speaks honestly.
After the murder of Duncan, Macbeth plans by himself (the middle action of the
play). He seeks to conquer the future, to make himself like a god - knowing and
controlling the future - but he becomes more like a beast. His first intended victims
are Banquo and Fleance, so as to nullify the prophecies of the weird sisters to Banquo. Foiled by the escape of Fleance and by the reappearance of Banquo ("time has
been, I That, when the brains were out, the man would die" IV.iv.76-77), Macbeth
seeks out the witches. He is going to force truth from them: it is a measure of how
far he is gone in his irrationality that he now expects truth and reassurance from
these forces of darkness ("for now I am bent to know, I By the worst means, the
worst. For mine own good, I All causes shall give way" (Ill.iv.l33-35). He now believes that through sheer force of will he can forge his own future on this "bank and
shoal of time." He has closed the gap wherein reason and scruple can operate: "Strange
things I have in head, that will to hand, I Which must be acted ere they may be
scann'd" (Ill.iv.138-39).
The very hopelessness and futility of Macbeth's mad ambition is signified by the
focus on babes and children in the visions that he sees in the cave of the witches:
children are the future, and they cannot be controlled (we are reminded of the "naked
babe" in Macbeth's vision of the consequences of murder). Now Macbeth sees the
bloody child, signifying the babe not directly born of woman; the child crowned with
a tree, signifying the branches of Birnam Wood cut and moving. But Macbeth hears
only the promises of invulnerability as "Sweet bodements! good!' He looks forward
to his long life: "and our high-plac'd Macbeth I Shall live the lease of Nature, pay
his breath I To time, and mortal custom" (IV.i.97-100). With these false assurances,
Macbeth ceases to think: "From this moment, I The very firstlings of my heart shall
be I The firstlings of my hand" (IV.i.l46-48). He has closed the gap. He will conquer
the future. He will act like a man. What he orders is the meaningless killings of Macduff's wife and children. Through slaughter of these agencies of the future (wife and
children) he will punish Macduff.
It was suggested earlier that the tragedy of the Macbeths is that they never quite
succeed in quieting, completely, the voice of reason or sense of consequences. To Lady
Macbeth, the voice of conscience is almost inaudible: it speaks only when she is asleep.
Nevertheless she demands light about her always, even though (because her eyes of
sense are closed) she cannot see it, and her babbling words reveal knowledge of all
the murders, including the killing of Lady Macduff, and all her pretenses. In the re-
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cent performance by the Royal Shakespeare Company, Lady Macbeth smears a red
cosmetic over her mouth in the sleepwalking sce!le, making her resemble the witch
who, in the opening scene, says she has been "killing swine;' and who turns a bloodsmeared face to the audience. The effect is to let us see that Lady Macbeth "witchifies"
herself in choosing the foul, or beastly way. Macbeth, too, when his kingdom is collapsing around him, remains bleakly aware: how could he have expected anything
but "mouth honour?" Yet he remains conscious of what might accompany age - not
only "the lease of Nature;' but "honour, love, obedience, troops of friends" (V.iii.25).
One might almost be amused that he, practiced in equivocation, is now the receiver
of "mouth honour;' barely concealed curses. He seems even to want the best for his
kingdom (for the first time): "If thou couldst, Doctor, cast I The water of my land,
find her disease, I And purge it to a sound and pristine health, I I would applaud
thee to the very echo" (V.iii.S0-53). Most significantly and indeed, somewhat to our
surprise he hesitates to confront Macduff in combat from a dim qualm of conscience.
Though his wife is dead, though his future is a long sequence of tomorrows, he is
nevertheless reluctant to add Macduff to his list of victims because "my soul is too
much charg'd I With blood of thine already" (V.viii.?-8). In other words, though he
believes himself the sure winner ("I bear a charmed life" [V.viii.l2]) and could join
wish to act in the instant, some vestige of light, or scruple, remains.
Finally, we may say that Macbeth was better off when he was vacillating, when
he was not a "man;' when he did hesitate. The less he debates with himself, the more
monstrous he becomes; his most "sure;' his most unequivocal act is the murder of
Macduffs wife and children. But, put this way, we seem to be in trouble regarding
decisive action. Are we suggesting that it is better to be indecisive rather than decisive? No, that can't be so. It's not that it's better to vacillate as such, or that it's better
to be decisive as such, but that, when one is decisive, one is decisive in choosing
the good rather than the bad. The unavoidable fundamental reality is the distinction
between the "fair" and the "foul:' But can we leave it at acting decisively for the good?
We need only recall Duncan, who seemed to always act unequivocally for the good:
all his actions were ingenuous, open, generous, well-intentioned, noble - all becoming of a good king. In fact, he seems to be the perfect foil to the Macbeths. But we
cannot forget the results: his ugly murder, plus the terrible convulsions in the political realm. It looks as if Duncan did not pay sufficient attention to the darkness.
If we ask what the play teaches us, we can say that there is a realm of light and
a realm of darkness: there really is what is fair, and there really is what is foul. Let
the light in! Let all the light in that we can, but never forget the darkness. That was
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Duncan's mistake: he didn't pay sufficient attention to the darkness. Duncan and
the Macbeths appear to be at the opposite extremes of light and darkness. The better, the workable, way seems to be Malcolm's, who shows his awareness of the powers
of darkness in the extraordinary scene where he tests Macduff by claiming to be what
he is not, a person of cruel appetites. Here equivocation is used for a good purpose,
to determine Macduff's motives before accepting him as a follower: perhaps Macduff
doesn't really care about the kingdom or, even worse, is an agent of Macbeth. Malcolm seems to have learned from both his father and Macbeth. There is good reason
to believe that foul Scotland will be more fair.
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